Development of disposition and skill of critical thinking and problem‐solving skessayblazers.com

2022-05-24 15:56:03Development of disposition and skill of critical thinking and problem‐solving skessayblazers.com
Place your order now for a similar assignment and have exceptional work written by our team of experts, At affordable ratesFor This or a Similar Paper Click To Order NowDevelopment of disposition and skill of critical thinking and problem‐solving skillPaul and Scriven (1987) defined critical thinking as the process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gath- ered through observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication. One of the primary aims of education is to augment students’ abilities to think critically by carrying out effective judgment processes (McMillan 1987). Critical thinking requires engaging stu- dents in information queries and helping them to analyze, synthesize and evaluate informa- tion to deal with problems and make decisions rather than merely repeating information (i.e. rote memorization) (Haynes and Bailey 2003). Whereas these activities are associ- ated with what has been called the cognitive dimension of critical thinking (Sosu 2013), recently, another dimension of critical thinking, the dispositional dimension, has emerged. Facione et al. (1997) have described critical thinking disposition succinctly as a consistent internal motivation to use critical thinking skills. Although, it has been argued, on the one hand, that possessing the disposition to think critically implies possession of the ability as well (Facione et al. 1995), it has also been argued, on the other hand, that the disposition towards critical thinking, while a necessary condition for thinking critically, is not a suf- ficient one. (Ernst and Monroe 2006).Gagne (1980) has stated that the main purpose of education should be to teach people to think by using their rational powers in order to solve problems effectively. Not only are the disposition and skill of critical thinking expected outcomes of higher education, they are also requirements in professional settings, where disposition is referred to as “profes- sional judgment” (Facione et al. 1997). The literature includes some evidence indicating that critical thinking disposition is related to good professional practice as well as profes- sional expertise (El-sayed et al. 2011; Facione et al. 1995). Critical thinking disposition has also been positively and moderately associated with perceptions of problem solving (Kirmizi et al. 2015).Recently, Jonassen (2000) criticized ID research and theory for failing to place sufficient emphasis on problem-solving processes, which is in line with his earlier statement that rather than well-structured problems, it is the ill-structured problems encountered in every- day life that need to be integrated into instruction (Jonassen 2002). Other researchers (Gla- ser 1991; Savery and Duffy 1995; Arts et al. 2002; Snyder and Snyder 2008) have similarly suggested that authentic contexts and real-life situations should be used for problem-solv- ing and critical thinking exercises. In terms of ID courses, this would require instructional131270 S. Toker, M. H. Baturaydesigners to think over what is most effective for the learners by applying methods that enable students to experience higher-order cognitive processes (Spector et al. 1992).Development of disposition and skill of critical thinking and problem‐solving skillPaul and Scriven (1987) defined critical thinking as the process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gath- ered through observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication. One of the primary aims of education is to augment students’ abilities to think critically by carrying out effective judgment processes (McMillan 1987). Critical thinking requires engaging stu- dents in information queries and helping them to analyze, synthesize and evaluate informa- tion to deal with problems and make decisions rather than merely repeating information (i.e. rote memorization) (Haynes and Bailey 2003). Whereas these activities are associ- ated with what has been called the cognitive dimension of critical thinking (Sosu 2013), recently, another dimension of critical thinking, the dispositional dimension, has emerged. Facione et al. (1997) have described critical thinking disposition succinctly as a consistent internal motivation to use critical thinking skills. Although, it has been argued, on the one hand, that possessing the disposition to think critically implies possession of the ability as well (Facione et al. 1995), it has also been argued, on the other hand, that the disposition towards critical thinking, while a necessary condition for thinking critically, is not a suf- ficient one. (Ernst and Monroe 2006).Gagne (1980) has stated that the main purpose of education should be to teach people to think by using their rational powers in order to solve problems effectively. Not only are the disposition and skill of critical thinking expected outcomes of higher education, they are also requirements in professional settings, where disposition is referred to as “profes- sional judgment” (Facione et al. 1997). The literature includes some evidence indicating that critical thinking disposition is related to good professional practice as well as profes- sional expertise (El-sayed et al. 2011; Facione et al. 1995). Critical thinking disposition has also been positively and moderately associated with perceptions of problem solving (Kirmizi et al. 2015).Recently, Jonassen (2000) criticized ID research and theory for failing to place sufficient emphasis on problem-solving processes, which is in line with his earlier statement that rather than well-structured problems, it is the ill-structured problems encountered in every- day life that need to be integrated into instruction (Jonassen 2002). Other researchers (Gla- ser 1991; Savery and Duffy 1995; Arts et al. 2002; Snyder and Snyder 2008) have similarly suggested that authentic contexts and real-life situations should be used for problem-solv- ing and critical thinking exercises. In terms of ID courses, this would require instructional131270 S. Toker, M. H. Baturaydesigners to think over what is most effective for the learners by applying methods that enable students to experience higher-order cognitive processes (Spector et al. 1992).The Atemporal, Temporal God: Divine Atemporality and the Challenge of the IncarnationNICHOLAS MARICLELeibniz Law Problems (LLPs) are a family of arguments based on Leibniz’s Law. Proposed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz’s Law holds that “if x and y are identical, then every property of x is a prop- erty of y, and vice versa.”1 Though Leibniz’s Law seems innocuous at first, LLPs pose serious difficulties for classical theism.2 In particu- lar, Thomas Senor’s version of the LLP is one of the most intractable arguments against God’s atemporality.Christian theologians have traditionally held that God is atem- poral. While the Bible does not speak directly to the issue of God’s relationship to time, theologians usually understand divine atempo- rality to be implied by verses that affirm divine immutability, such as Malachi 3:6, Hebrews 13:8, and James 1:17, among others.3 In this article, I assume the relevant biblical data and proceed toward illu- minating the mystery that is at the very heart of the gospel of Christ: how the transcendent, atemporal God can become supremely imma- nent and temporal in the incarnation.41. C. Stephen Layman, The Power of Logic, 3rd ed. (New York, N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 2005), 442.2. Classical theism is a debated phrase in Christian theology. By this phrase, I mean the stream of Christian reflection on the nature of God that includes Augustine of Hippo, Anselm of Canterbury, and Thomas Aquinas, the important differences in their theologies of God notwithstanding.3. William Mann argues that divine immutability, simplicity, and atemporality are logically connected. Of these three attributes, immutability has the most solid biblical basis. Consequently, arguments from Scripture in favor of divine atem- porality usually proceed from verses that teach divine immutability. See William Mann, “Simplicity and Immutability,” International Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 3 (September 1983): 267–76.4. Thomas Weinandy is a helpful voice on mystery elucidation in theology.144 PuriTan reformeD journalSenor’s LLP is a simple argument that helps us see the mystery inherent in the incarnation. Perhaps the potency of the argument is due, at least in part, to the common-sense nature of the argument:1 Jesus Christ read in the synagogue (at the start of His minis- try) before He carried the cross.2 So, temporal predicates apply to Jesus Christ.3 Jesus Christ = God the Son4 So, temporal predicates apply to God the Son.5 Temporal predicates don’t apply to timeless beings.6 So, God the Son isn’t timeless.5The argument is a quagmire for those who accept the classical view of God as presented in most confessions of faith and creeds. Though classical theists are loath to accept the conclusion of this argument, how to avoid the conclusion is far from clear. As we shall see, the best rebuttals of the argument focus on (3). The strategy of attacking (3), though initially promising, is fraught with difficulty, as heresy is always lurking nearby. While reputable theologians and philosophers agree that (3) seems dubious in some way, Chalcedonian Christology seems to require at least some version of (3). Consequently, how to reject (3) while remaining faithful to Chalcedon has frequently eluded erudite thinkers.I will defend what I call the application principle. My application principle holds that statements about the man Jesus of Nazareth are directly applicable to the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, if and only if the statement does not contradict God’s amoral charac- teristics.6 As I will argue, my application principle will accomplishWeinandy says that “the true goal of theological inquiry is not the resolution of theological problems, but the discernment of what the mystery of faith is. Because God, who can never be fully comprehended, lies at the heart of all theological enquiry, theology by its nature is not a problem solving enterprise, but rather a mys- tery discerning enterprise.” Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ill.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 32, emphasis original.5. Thomas D. Senor, “Incarnation and Timelessness,” Faith and Philosophy 7, no. 1 (April 1990): 150. Senor calls this argument “[A].” My 1–6 correspond to his P1–P3 and C1–C3.6. Theologians use many different taxonomies to categorize God’s attributes. One such taxonomy distinguishes God’s moral and amoral attributes. According to this taxonomy, God’s moral attributes are attributes that God has because He isThe aTemPoral, TemPoral GoD 145three goals. First, the application principle will provide a rationale for how classical theists can hold both that God is timeless and that the Son of God is incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. Significantly, my application principle does not resolve the mystery of the Person of Christ. Instead, my application principle seeks to insulate the mystery of the person of Christ from Senor’s LLP. My second goal is to avoid the errors of other solutions to Senor’s LLP. I resonate with many of the other approaches to the problem, and I believe that their learned defenders were rejecting the correct premise in the LLP—(3) is mis- leading indeed. Unfortunately, prior attempts to avoid the LLP fell short because, as I will argue, they approached the problem from the wrong direction. As a result, they solved the problem only at great theological costs. Consequently, my third and final goal is to avoid the LLP while remaining faithful to the Chalcedonian Definition.The State of the ProblemChalcedon was enormously important for the development of ortho- dox Christology. Convened in 451 a.D., this council had the difficult task of stating how Christ could simultaneously be both God and human. The council’s judgment has been forever enshrined in the famous Chalcedonian Definition.Oliver Crisp argues that the Chalcedonian Definition established a dogmatic minimalism. Any Christology that claims to be orthodox must meet the four standards established at Chalcedon:7. Christ is one Person.8. Christ has two natures, one divine and one human.9. The two natures of Christ retain their integrity and are dis- tinct; they are not mixed together or confused, nor are theygood. For example, God is loving, patient, kind, etc. because He is good. God also has amoral attributes. Some theologians may call the amoral attributes God’s great- making attributes. A list of God’s amoral attributes would include His omnipotence, omniscience, and atemporality, among others. While this taxonomy is useful for my purposes in this paper, I am loath to speak of God’s amoral attributes because I accept divine simplicity. Along with other classical theists, I do not believe there is any real distinction between God’s moral and amoral attributes. God’s omnipotence is His love. Any distinction we see between the divine attributes says more about us than it does about God. Thus, to speak of God’s amoral attributes is to couch the entire discussion in analogical language.146 PuriTan reformeD journal amalgamated into a hybrid of divine and human attributes(like a demigod).10. The natures of Christ are really united in the Person of Christ; that is, they are two natures possessed by one Person.7According to Crisp, any theological discussion of the Person of Christ must do justice both to Christ’s dual natures and to His single, uni- fied person. Chalcedon judges any formulation that compromises either Christ’s divinity or His humanity as insufficient at best and heretical at worst.The dogmatic minimalism of Chalcedon makes Senor’s LLP a significant threat to classical theism. Senor aims his LLP at what he calls a “traditional” doctrine of God that, along with the other “traditional divine attributes,” says that God is atemporal. In particu- lar, Senor is addressing Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann’s well-known argument for divine atemporality in their famous article “Eternity.”8 If the LLP is cogent, the classical theist will thus have to choose between classical theism and an orthodox doctrine of the incarnation.Stump and Kretzmann were not the first scholars to argue that God is atemporal. Divine atemporality is actually a much older position. Stump and Kretzmann claim that Boethius (ca. 524 a.D.) provides the locus classicus of divine atemporality in his Consolation of Philosophy. Boethius argues that God’s atemporality “is the common judgment of all who live by reason.” Contrary to humanity’s transi- tory existence, God “possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing future is absent and nothing past has flowed away.”9 Stump and Kretzmann thus stand at the end of a long theological tradition that predates Christianity. Christian theologians adopted this tradition to such an extent that divine atemporality has arguably been the default position regarding God’s relationship to time within Christendom.7. Oliver Crisp, “Desiderata for Models of the Hypostatic Union” in Christology: Ancient and Modern, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), 19–41 (29).8. Thomas D. Senor, “Incarnation and Timelessness,” 149.9. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, trans. P. G. Walsh (New York, N.Y.: Oxford, 1999), 5.6.2 ff.The aTemPoral, TemPoral GoD 147Classical theism accepts divine atemporality for good rea- son. Augustine saw a connection between God’s immutability and His atemporality. He contrasts creation, which suffers “change and variation,” with God, who is “unchangeably eternal.”10 The modern theologian James Dolezal concurs: If God exists inside of time, God has to change in some way, for this is the nature of time-bound crea- tures. To be temporal is to be in a constant state of change, even if the change is only the change of temporal succession.11Dolezal argues that divine atemporality is more important than Augustine realized. In addition to immutability, atemporality is essen- tial to divine simplicity and divine infinity. Divine simplicity denies that God is composed of parts. However, if God exists in time, then He cannot be completely simple because His existence is composed of “before-and-after moments.”12 If God is simple, then God cannot be composed of temporal parts. Likewise, divine infinity asserts that God exists without any limitation. God possesses all of His attributes to an infinite degree because nothing limits His love, power, or wis- dom, to name a few qualities. However, if God exists within time, then He is limited by time and is thus not completely infinite. “One who says ‘time’ says motion, change, measurability, computability, limitation, finiteness, creature.”13 Thus, for the classical theist, atem- porality is a key component of the nature of God.14The importance of divine atemporality places the classical theist in a difficult position. On the one hand, many theologians, even those who are not classical theists per se, are convinced that God is time- less. Based on biblical, philosophical, or theological considerations, reputable theologians from all periods of church history have defended divine atemporality. To be blunt, there are good reasons to believe God is atemporal. Consequently, to be fully Chalcedonian, any doctrine of the incarnation must believe that Christ remains timeless during the incarnation. To strip Christ of His timelessness seems to prevent Him10. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York, N.Y.: Oxford, 1991), 11.4.6; 11.30.40.11. James E. Dolezal, All That Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), 88.12. Dolezal, All That Is in God, 88.13. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, eds. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 2:163.14. Dolezal, All That Is in God, 87–89.The Atemporal, Temporal God: Divine Atemporality and the Challenge of the IncarnationNICHOLAS MARICLELeibniz Law Problems (LLPs) are a family of arguments based on Leibniz’s Law. Proposed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz’s Law holds that “if x and y are identical, then every property of x is a prop- erty of y, and vice versa.”1 Though Leibniz’s Law seems innocuous at first, LLPs pose serious difficulties for classical theism.2 In particu- lar, Thomas Senor’s version of the LLP is one of the most intractable arguments against God’s atemporality.Christian theologians have traditionally held that God is atem- poral. While the Bible does not speak directly to the issue of God’s relationship to time, theologians usually understand divine atempo- rality to be implied by verses that affirm divine immutability, such as Malachi 3:6, Hebrews 13:8, and James 1:17, among others.3 In this article, I assume the relevant biblical data and proceed toward illu- minating the mystery that is at the very heart of the gospel of Christ: how the transcendent, atemporal God can become supremely imma- nent and temporal in the incarnation.41. C. Stephen Layman, The Power of Logic, 3rd ed. (New York, N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 2005), 442.2. Classical theism is a debated phrase in Christian theology. By this phrase, I mean the stream of Christian reflection on the nature of God that includes Augustine of Hippo, Anselm of Canterbury, and Thomas Aquinas, the important differences in their theologies of God notwithstanding.3. William Mann argues that divine immutability, simplicity, and atemporality are logically connected. Of these three attributes, immutability has the most solid biblical basis. Consequently, arguments from Scripture in favor of divine atem- porality usually proceed from verses that teach divine immutability. See William Mann, “Simplicity and Immutability,” International Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 3 (September 1983): 267–76.4. Thomas Weinandy is a helpful voice on mystery elucidation in theology.144 PuriTan reformeD journalSenor’s LLP is a simple argument that helps us see the mystery inherent in the incarnation. Perhaps the potency of the argument is due, at least in part, to the common-sense nature of the argument:7 Jesus Christ read in the synagogue (at the start of His minis- try) before He carried the cross.8 So, temporal predicates apply to Jesus Christ.9 Jesus Christ = God the Son10 So, temporal predicates apply to God the Son.11 Temporal predicates don’t apply to timeless beings.12 So, God the Son isn’t timeless.5The argument is a quagmire for those who accept the classical view of God as presented in most confessions of faith and creeds. Though classical theists are loath to accept the conclusion of this argument, how to avoid the conclusion is far from clear. As we shall see, the best rebuttals of the argument focus on (3). The strategy of attacking (3), though initially promising, is fraught with difficulty, as heresy is always lurking nearby. While reputable theologians and philosophers agree that (3) seems dubious in some way, Chalcedonian Christology seems to require at least some version of (3). Consequently, how to reject (3) while remaining faithful to Chalcedon has frequently eluded erudite thinkers.I will defend what I call the application principle. My application principle holds that statements about the man Jesus of Nazareth are directly applicable to the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, if and only if the statement does not contradict God’s amoral charac- teristics.6 As I will argue, my application principle will accomplishWeinandy says that “the true goal of theological inquiry is not the resolution of theological problems, but the discernment of what the mystery of faith is. Because God, who can never be fully comprehended, lies at the heart of all theological enquiry, theology by its nature is not a problem solving enterprise, but rather a mys- tery discerning enterprise.” Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ill.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 32, emphasis original.5. Thomas D. Senor, “Incarnation and Timelessness,” Faith and Philosophy 7, no. 1 (April 1990): 150. Senor calls this argument “[A].” My 1–6 correspond to his P1–P3 and C1–C3.6. Theologians use many different taxonomies to categorize God’s attributes. One such taxonomy distinguishes God’s moral and amoral attributes. According to this taxonomy, God’s moral attributes are attributes that God has because He isThe aTemPoral, TemPoral GoD 145three goals. First, the application principle will provide a rationale for how classical theists can hold both that God is timeless and that the Son of God is incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. Significantly, my application principle does not resolve the mystery of the Person of Christ. Instead, my application principle seeks to insulate the mystery of the person of Christ from Senor’s LLP. My second goal is to avoid the errors of other solutions to Senor’s LLP. I resonate with many of the other approaches to the problem, and I believe that their learned defenders were rejecting the correct premise in the LLP—(3) is mis- leading indeed. Unfortunately, prior attempts to avoid the LLP fell short because, as I will argue, they approached the problem from the wrong direction. As a result, they solved the problem only at great theological costs. Consequently, my third and final goal is to avoid the LLP while remaining faithful to the Chalcedonian Definition.The State of the ProblemChalcedon was enormously important for the development of ortho- dox Christology. Convened in 451 a.D., this council had the difficult task of stating how Christ could simultaneously be both God and human. The council’s judgment has been forever enshrined in the famous Chalcedonian Definition.Oliver Crisp argues that the Chalcedonian Definition established a dogmatic minimalism. Any Christology that claims to be orthodox must meet the four standards established at Chalcedon:7. Christ is one Person.8. Christ has two natures, one divine and one human.9. The two natures of Christ retain their integrity and are dis- tinct; they are not mixed together or confused, nor are theygood. For example, God is loving, patient, kind, etc. because He is good. God also has amoral attributes. Some theologians may call the amoral attributes God’s great- making attributes. A list of God’s amoral attributes would include His omnipotence, omniscience, and atemporality, among others. While this taxonomy is useful for my purposes in this paper, I am loath to speak of God’s amoral attributes because I accept divine simplicity. Along with other classical theists, I do not believe there is any real distinction between God’s moral and amoral attributes. God’s omnipotence is His love. Any distinction we see between the divine attributes says more about us than it does about God. Thus, to speak of God’s amoral attributes is to couch the entire discussion in analogical language.146 PuriTan reformeD journal amalgamated into a hybrid of divine and human attributes(like a demigod).10. The natures of Christ are really united in the Person of Christ; that is, they are two natures possessed by one Person.7According to Crisp, any theological discussion of the Person of Christ must do justice both to Christ’s dual natures and to His single, uni- fied person. Chalcedon judges any formulation that compromises either Christ’s divinity or His humanity as insufficient at best and heretical at worst.The dogmatic minimalism of Chalcedon makes Senor’s LLP a significant threat to classical theism. Senor aims his LLP at what he calls a “traditional” doctrine of God that, along with the other “traditional divine attributes,” says that God is atemporal. In particu- lar, Senor is addressing Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann’s well-known argument for divine atemporality in their famous article “Eternity.”8 If the LLP is cogent, the classical theist will thus have to choose between classical theism and an orthodox doctrine of the incarnation.Stump and Kretzmann were not the first scholars to argue that God is atemporal. Divine atemporality is actually a much older position. Stump and Kretzmann claim that Boethius (ca. 524 a.D.) provides the locus classicus of divine atemporality in his Consolation of Philosophy. Boethius argues that God’s atemporality “is the common judgment of all who live by reason.” Contrary to humanity’s transi- tory existence, God “possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing future is absent and nothing past has flowed away.”9 Stump and Kretzmann thus stand at the end of a long theological tradition that predates Christianity. Christian theologians adopted this tradition to such an extent that divine atemporality has arguably been the default position regarding God’s relationship to time within Christendom.7. Oliver Crisp, “Desiderata for Models of the Hypostatic Union” in Christology: Ancient and Modern, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), 19–41 (29).8. Thomas D. Senor, “Incarnation and Timelessness,” 149.9. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, trans. P. G. Walsh (New York, N.Y.: Oxford, 1999), 5.6.2 ff.The aTemPoral, TemPoral GoD 147Classical theism accepts divine atemporality for good rea- son. Augustine saw a connection between God’s immutability and His atemporality. He contrasts creation, which suffers “change and variation,” with God, who is “unchangeably eternal.”10 The modern theologian James Dolezal concurs: If God exists inside of time, God has to change in some way, for this is the nature of time-bound crea- tures. To be temporal is to be in a constant state of change, even if the change is only the change of temporal succession.11Dolezal argues that divine atemporality is more important than Augustine realized. In addition to immutability, atemporality is essen- tial to divine simplicity and divine infinity. Divine simplicity denies that God is composed of parts. However, if God exists in time, then He cannot be completely simple because His existence is composed of “before-and-after moments.”12 If God is simple, then God cannot be composed of temporal parts. Likewise, divine infinity asserts that God exists without any limitation. God possesses all of His attributes to an infinite degree because nothing limits His love, power, or wis- dom, to name a few qualities. However, if God exists within time, then He is limited by time and is thus not completely infinite. “One who says ‘time’ says motion, change, measurability, computability, limitation, finiteness, creature.”13 Thus, for the classical theist, atem- porality is a key component of the nature of God.14The importance of divine atemporality places the classical theist in a difficult position. On the one hand, many theologians, even those who are not classical theists per se, are convinced that God is time- less. Based on biblical, philosophical, or theological considerations, reputable theologians from all periods of church history have defended divine atemporality. To be blunt, there are good reasons to believe God is atemporal. Consequently, to be fully Chalcedonian, any doctrine of the incarnation must believe that Christ remains timeless during the incarnation. To strip Christ of His timelessness seems to prevent Him10. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York, N.Y.: Oxford, 1991), 11.4.6; 11.30.40.11. James E. Dolezal, All That Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), 88.12. Dolezal, All That Is in God, 88.13. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, eds. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 2:163.14. Dolezal, All That Is in God, 87–89.For This or a Similar Paper Click To Order NowRelated
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